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Is inequality associated with conflict? There is little doubt about
the importance of this question and the implications it has for governance
and government. Conflict is costly for society. In its cheapest form it alters
the social and productive fabric of society that has been built over
generations, and in its more expensive form it can destroy them beyond
repair. If ameliorating inequality can forestall conflict, the role of
government as an agency that can capably redistribute wealth and income
is critical. To be sure, inequality need not be the only source of conflict.
Weak rule of law, biased or ineffective enforcement of property rights and
dearth of social capital are examples of poor or missing institutions that
may aggravate conflict. Their absence can trigger conflict independently
of inequality. When interacted with weak institutions, it is a trigger.
We empirically examine this association between inequality and
conflict. The setting is the Maoist rebellion in Nepal that has claimed
thousands of lives since it began in 1996. The regional variations across
villages in Nepal afford a rich experiment, without having to use crosscountry data, for exploring the nature of association between conflict and
inequality. When using cross-country data, the heterogeneity in crosscultural norms, institutions, and unique historical settings can produce
different reference points or anchors, and a lack of common anchor within
the sample can bias the perception of the threat and hence the
measurement of such variables. Cultural and historical differences may
influence the perception of acceptable levels of violence in cross-country
settings. Our micro level sub-national data avoids such cross-cultural
heterogeneity and differential perceptions.
This research departs from previous empirical studies in three
respects. First, the empirical specification is motivated by rational choice
theory. The theory clearly brings out the logic for why, when society
becomes unequal, agents may resort to forcible redistribution by unlawful
means. In the absence of effective institutions these means can and do turn
violent. The theory is used to produce testable hypotheses about the
relationship between inequality and conflict. The issue variables in our
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model thus have a strong link with underlying theory. Second, our data are
sub-national, at the village level, within Nepal. Thus, they suffer less from
heterogeneity problem than do cross-country data or even the district level
data that have been used frequently in the literature. Empirically, we
model killings by Maoists using a hierarchical (count-data) model in order
to account for the remaining heterogeneity in the data. Third and perhaps
most important, we go beyond the popular Gini index to measure
inequality. We employ measures of economic polarization as ethnic
polarization does not seem to be a good predictor of Maoist’s Peoples War
in Nepal.
Using negative binomial count data models with test and
correction for endogenity, results from multi-level analysis are robust and
highly significant irrespective of the measure of inequality (GINI or
POLARIZATION) used for the analysis, indicating that distributional
outcomes do matter significantly when it comes to violent conflict.
However, inequality or polarization is not the only source of violent
conflict. As discussed in this paper, poor institutions such as weak rule of
law, weak enforcement of property rights, and dearth of social capital can
help to propagate the conflict. Our empirical results find support to the
hypothesis that social capital generates valuable spillover effects in the
form of shared value, norms, self-governance and understandings among
the villagers that encourages the community members to cooperate among
themselves that helps deterring the violent conflict.
Another important finding of our research is that transfer of
resources from the central to the local governments can play vital role in
lowering the violence as it may provide a sense of hope, connectedness
and opportunity to the local people. In the backdrop of widespread poverty
in the villages of Nepal, we also find a significant positive association
between level of poverty and the intensity of violence. The policy
implications of these findings are that government policies towards
balancing the unintended inequality combined with grants and targeted
transfers for reducing poverty can potentially solve much of the problems
for which the Maoists are blamed. Such policies can deliver expected
outcomes provided that the transferred funds find their way to the intended
beneficiaries. International agencies, local institutions, Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs), and civil society can play meaningful roles by
developing a productive partnership to achieve such objectives in the light
of widespread perceptions that corruption is rampant in the government
offices and such corruption also engenders poverty. Motivating such
partnership towards promoting social networks in the local communities
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would provide an added bonus for creating lasting peace as we find that
social capital helps to inhibit the violence by promoting understandings
among the community members.
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